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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dennis Ray Smith appeals from the denial of his motions requesting credit 
for time seNed for time spent on probation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Smith pied guilty to forgery and was granted a withheld judgment and 
probation. (R., pp. 50-53.) Smith violated the conditions of his probation and the 
district court revoked the withheld judgment, imposed a sentence of five years 
with two years fixed, and placed Smith back on probation. (R., pp. 115-16.) 
When Smith again violated the conditions of his probation the court revoked 
probation, ordered the sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 
143-44.) Thereafter the district court again placed Smith on probation. (R., pp. 
148-50.) After Smith's next probation violation the district court revoked the 
probation and ordered the sentence executed. (R., pp. 180-81.) 
About ten months later Smith moved for credit for time seNed, including 
credit for time spent on probation. (R., pp. 185-94.) The district judge denied the 
motion by writing "Denied" on the face of it and signing her name. (R., p. 185.) 
Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his motion. (R., pp. 195-
97.) Smith filed a second motion requesting credit for time seNed, which the 




Smith states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith credit 
for the time he served on probation. 
2. Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Smith's Rule 
35 motion and failed to provide an adequate record in regard 
to its denials of his Rule 35 motion and motion for credit for 
time served? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Smith failed to demonstrate error by the trial court because his 
argument that he was entitled to credit for time spent on probation against his 
term of imprisonment is frivolous? 
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ARGUMENT 
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions For Credit For 
Time Served Because His Argument That He Is Entitled To Credit For Time 
Spent On Probation Against His Term Of Imprisonment Is Frivolous 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Smith's motions to credit time spent on probation 
against his sentence.1 (R., pp. 185, 227.) Smith argues that he was entitled to 
such credit, but fails to actually address controlling authority. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 5-24.) Because Smith has failed to address controlling authority his 
argument is without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The construction and application of a statute also 
presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. 
State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). 
1 The state acknowledges that the district court did not comply with I.C.R. 47 and 
that the stated reason of untimeliness was not the proper ground for denial of 
Smith's second motion. Any such error, however, is necessarily harmless under 
the applicable legal standards. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 
918, 923 (2010) (errors may be declared harmless); State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 
690, 694, 991 P .2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1999) (where trial court has reached right 
result it will be affirmed under correct legal theory). 
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C. Smith's Argument That He Was Entitled To Credit For Time Spent On 
Probation Against His Sentence Is Contrary To Existing And Unchallenged 
Authority 
Under Idaho law an inmate is entitled to credit for time served if he is 
incarcerated on that sentence. I.C. § 18-309; Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 
403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d 
1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008). He is not entitled to credit for time served if he is not 
incarcerated but is instead on probation or parole. I.C. § 18-309; I.C. § 19-2603 
(time spent "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as a 
part of the term of his sentence"); I.C. § 20-209A ("time during which the person 
is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the 
board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not 
be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced"); 
Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869, 187 P.3d at 1244 (1.C. § 18-309 "notably does not base 
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration"). Indeed, a defendant is not 
entitled to credit for time actually spent incarcerated during his probation against 
his sentence if such incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation. 
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8, 43 P.3d 765, 767 (2002). Smith's argument that 
he was entitled to credit for time spent on probation against his term of 
imprisonment is meritless because it merely ignores applicable legal authority. 
Even reviewed on its own merits Smith's argument is without merit. The 
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that statute. State 
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those words must 
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be 
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construed as a whole. kl "Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 642, 
239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
The plain language of the applicable statutes shows Smith is not entitled to credit 
time on probation against the execution of his sentence. 
By definition, when a court places a defendant on probation it "suspend[s] 
the execution of the judgment." I.C. § 19-2601 (2). The time of probation is not 
limited to the actual sentence but may be up to "the maximum period for which 
the defendant might have been imprisoned." I.C. § 19-2601 (7). That the 
probation runs only while execution of the judgment is suspended and may 
actually exceed the length of the sentence itself demonstrates that time on 
probation is not credited toward satisfaction of the judgment. 
Smith attempts to secure the result he wants from the language of I.C. § 
18-309, which provides that "if ... the defendant by any legal means is temporarily 
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time 
during which he was at large must not be computed as part" of the term of 
imprisonment. Specifically, Smith claims that 'at large" means "free; 
unrestrained; not under control" and therefore cannot mean time spent under the 
legal restraint imposed by probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) This argument 
fails for three reasons. 
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First, "at large" does not mean free of all legal restraint. Rather, "at large" 
means "not under corporal control," Black's law Dictionary, p. 125 (6th Ed.1990); 
"[n]ot in confinement or captivity," The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 715 (2d 
College Ed., 1982); or "not in prison," Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary 
(Cambridge Dictionaries Online). Indeed, an escapee is not free of legal 
restraint. Smith's attempt to distinguish between those who have submitted to 
legal restraint on freedom and those who have not for purposes of defining "at 
large" is not supported by the language of the statute. "At large," given its 
common and ordinary meaning, refers to a defendant who is not under the 
physical restraint of incarceration. 
Second, Smith's attempted definition mutilates the context of the phrase 
"at large." Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence of the statute. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 
(2005). The statute addressed by Smith provides that, in "computing the term of 
imprisonment," "if," after the pronouncement of sentence imposing a term of 
imprisonment, "the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from 
such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he 
was at large must not be computed as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309. Under 
this plain language the "time during which he was at large" is directly related to 
the temporary release "by any legal means," generally probation or parole, and is 
not calculated as part of the "imprisonment." Smith's claim that the use of the 
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phrase "at large" in the statute transmogrifies probation into a period of 
imprisonment is baseless. 2 
The context of Idaho law also shows that Smith's argument that "at large" 
applies only to those who have absconded or escaped is without merit. A court 
at sentencing is to consider whether a defendant is a risk to society as a result of 
mental illness if the defendant is "at large." I.C. § 19-2523(e). The idea thatthis 
consideration goes only to possible escapes, as Smith would have us believe, is, 
at best, illogical. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that if a prisoner 
is permitted "to go at large out of the jail, except by virtue of a legal order or 
process, it is an escape." Cornell v. Mason, 46 Idaho 112, 120, 268 P. 8, 11 
(1928) (emphasis added). Clearly the concept of being set "at large" by legal 
means is not a concept foreign to Idaho jurisprudence as claimed by Smith. 
Finally, Smith's argument ignores the overall statutory scheme related to 
credit for time served. A court must construe statutes relating to the same 
subject matter together to further legislative intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 
378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (1999). Idaho Code section 19-2603, which deals 
specifically with "[p]ronouncement and execution of judgment after violation of 
probation" (emphasis omitted), provides that a suspended sentence may be 
"executed" and, if so, the time the defendant was "at large under such suspended 
sentence shall not be counted" as time served. In addition, a defendant is not 
2 Smith's argument that probation is not a "temporary" release from custody 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-17) is without basis. Because calculation of time served 
is only needed upon revocation of probation, any application of the statute after a 
probation violation means the probation was necessarily a "temporary" release 
from custody. 
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entitled to credit for time he was "voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, 
facility under the control of the board of correction, or from the custody of an 
officer after his sentence." I.C. § 20-209A. Reading these statutes together 
plainly shows legislative intent that time spent on probation, and thus "at large 
under [a] suspended sentence" and "voluntarily absent from the penitentiary," not 
be counted against the service of a sentence of imprisonment. 
Smith's argument is without merit. Smith fails to acknowledge or address 
controlling legal authority. Even if the merits of his argument were reached 
despite his failure to address controlling authority, they are baseless. Smith has 
failed to show error in the denial of his motions for credit for time served. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Smith's motions for credit against his sentence for time spent on 
probation. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of May, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/pm 
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